177 Berberizes, among other things, words, and the umbrella[5]...; and when
671 Koranic laws apply to him, he follows them only if they are compli-
779 mentary to his own custom; but, if there is a contradiction, it is custom, and not the Shari'a, which is followed, and followed without question.[6]

181 5) The author's expression of his personal sympathy for the Rifians: men who are "brave, loyal, hard-working, intelligent, modest, honorable, (long-)suffering, and austere."[7]

B) Introduction to Social Structure (fragmentary):

602 1) As an agricultural and warlike people, the social ties of
571 the Rifians are rudimentary[8] and become weaker as the number of individuals associated with them increase: thus, from family to tribe, from village to region, there is a decrease in consistency. Strong in
613 "elemental" groupings like the agnatic lineage or the dharfiqth, which
621 units its members through blood ties[9], they lose rigidity although
619 they are still precise and detailed in the jma'th (or local community)[10], and they become looser and more difficult to recognize in the upper-level groups, the dhaqbitsh[11] and its "fractions"[12], which nevertheless constitute the true "homeland" in North Africa, and are independent units[13].

571 2) The Rifian social organisms (i.e. units) are constituted
(602) by the associations between family (i.e. kin) groups which live together in the same territory, and thus have a localistic stamp which permits their evaluation in this manner. However, the institutions which constitute political groups do not have this character, as they are made up of elastic and complementary forms[14] which...retain

602 571 613 619 596 2) (The author's) concept of "groups": a) group of blood ties (i.e. kin group)--family jajgu or "ascending ramus" (read "lineage branch")[20] and dharfiqth or "family group" (read "lineage"); b) social group--jma'ath: "fraction" or canton [21] (khums, rba')[22] and tribe or dhaqbitsh; c) political group--liff or alliance; d) religious group--tariqa or religious brotherhood, and murabitic families (saints); and e) economic group--rural lands and property: storehouses[23], markets, Jews, "beneficial institutions"[24].

594 596 613 Rifians are thus grouped into three "associations" (i.e. levels) of kin groups: 1) hearth or (nuclear) family or dhaddarth[25]; 2) "ascending ramus" or jajgu (lineage branch); and 3) "family group" or dharfiqth (patrilineage).

594 3) The Nuclear Family or Hearth:--This is formed by the union of a man, a woman and their (unmarried) children, and it should be looked at from both the conjugal and filial standpoints. From a 594 595 183 [554] conjugal standpoint, it may be composed of a man and his four wives (and unmarried children). But Rifians are polygynous only in theory; in practice, only the well-to-do (such as shaikhs) are polygynous, and even they seldom have more than two wives. A poor man only tends to take a second wife if he has to, if, for example, he has divorced the first one for not bearing him any sons. The function of polygyny 595 182 [181] is to produce sons in order to prevent the extinction of the family in a society where the major law is "that of the strongest"[26], as well as to produce a sufficient number of male children to take care of agricultural tasks. "Oriental sensuality" is not a factor here, in any way.

726 strength of those who were first on the spot, and so that the points which were most threatened could be easily and quickly reinforced. [182] [701] The dissemination of contingents was imposed by geographical factors (i.e. by the extreme poverty of an area which is excessively compartmented and rought country), by political ones (i.e. lack of a single head at the top of the chain of command other than individuals of purely local prestige, and a recruitment system which set limits on the employment of large units) and even by technical ones (i.e. the European notion of reducing the defense of fixed points of strategic interest, as well as in finding them, is difficult for Rifians to assimilate, for they themselves merely wait in their hilltop houses, etc.)[8].

C) Rifian Alliances (fragmentary):

619 628 181 [602] The Rif was a mosaic of independent tribes, gnawed at by internal disputes in an inhospitable land. It was a powder-keg of individual personalities who placated misfortunes with more misfortunes, with misery, envy and egotism; each one of these men were followed by minuscule groups of kinsmen and partisans, with no tie greater to oppose an invader than their own ambition and convenience....

619 There was in the Rif, however, a certain internal equilibrium by which small tribes like the Targist, Thafarsith and Aith Wurishik[9] could persist, even though surrounded by powerful neighbors.

619 616 [648] Alliances seem the logical and necessary step to which the Rifians had recourse when threatened by superior powers, such as that of the Sultans. The main significance of alliances lies in defense against a common danger, as well as in its concomitant, mutual aid;

616 619 648 173 into which a minute initial event (i.e. the cause of the war) had developed, while the echo of gunshots and the splendors of vengeance lit up the Rifian mountain landscape....The Rifian alliance is established as a precaution taken by a weak man faced by the dangers of 616 619 182 disequilibrium within the social group of which he is a member, and it comes into play when the norms of coexistence are broken....When one studies life in the dispersed hamlets of the Rif, one sees at once how personal ambition and rival interests could, in the last analysis, break up their inhabitants and realign them into two or three rival bands[15] of more or less equal strength. When there are three such 616 619 bands[16], one of them acts as a buffer or cushion between the other two in order to maintain equilibrium and to prepare for the worst through alliance with neighboring villages or groups. This also happens with clans, and even with tribes.

[829] All of native science in the difficult art of government resides in a perfect knowledge and evaluation of these bands and of the rivalries which separate them in their own rich personal experience.... A great many tribal wars may be explained through the preference of one band, in a system of equilibrium of forces and balance of power, and through the logical reaction of the opposite band, which considered itself underestimated or slighted! The personalities and moving spirits in each band are also a factor to be considered[17].

616 621 Ordinarily the people in a village group themselves into two opposed bands of equal strength. When there are three such bands or [602] if equilibrium is for any reason upset, the foresight of the weak obliged them to ally themselves with family groups in neighboring villages, thus giving rise to the linkages[18] discussed earlier.

000 FOOTNOTES:

(114) 1--This should no doubt read, "by iziddjifen or imgharen".

2--We have not heard of any instance in which a tribal fine is divided
(682) up in this manner. Normally, when a man is fined for murder, for instance, the fine is split up into as many equal parts as there are clans in the tribe, after which each clan distributes its share of the fine among its component subclans, and so on down the line.

3--For an excellent and virtually contemporary account of what could happen at an agraw, see Coon, op. cit., 1931, p. 97, and Coon, Flesh of the Wild Ox, New York: Norrow, 1932, pp. 77-83. Coon's account is taken from the Igziwnayen, who pronounce the word ayraw.

(628) 4--This is indeed an excellent example, but Blanco does not say why:
(114) because the other Rifian tribes through which Bushta al-Baghdadi's army passed did their own share of pillaging the Ibuqquyen as well--and this was particularly true of the lowlanders of the Aith Waryaghar.

5--The term harka did not exist in the Rif prior to 'Abd al-Krim, and under his aegis the notion it implied reached its fullest flowering, through military (i.e. "regular" Rifian Army, a total of some 2500 men under the command of 'Abd al-Krim's younger brother Si Mhammad n Si 'Abd l-Krim) and ordinary tribal levies sent out to fight, first, the Spaniards on two fronts (east and west) and then the French on one (south). These contingents, both regular and irregular, were organized into groups of twelve, twenty-five, fifty, one hundred and three hundred men (the last mentioned constituting a tabur), each one of which was under a qa'id designated by the number of men under his command--qa'id at-tn'ash (of 12), qa'id l-khamsa w 'ashrin (of 25), qa'id l-khamsin (of 50), qa'id l-Miya (of 100), and qa'id attabur (of a tabur, or 300).
(171) However, the idea of the harka had been there previously, even if the organizational refinements set up by 'Abd al-Krim, who modeled them on those of the Sultan's Army, were new.

6--In actual fact, those imgharen already holding office merely became war leaders as well.

(602) 7--This statement does not quite jibe with the notion of conscription, above; but the principle was exactly the same as that of a powerful chief who could count on armed support from numerous lineage-mates and/or fellow clansmen.

8--This comparison is couched by Blanco in the form of a recommendation for the use of native harkas in Spanish service.

(114) 9--This is certainly true of the Targist and the Thafarsith, but not of the Aith Wurishik, who are a fairly powerful tribe in their own right.

10--In the original, todo el mundillo rifeño, which is fully as descriptive, and a good deal less pompous, than "conceptual universe", for example.

616 619 642 114 11--Berber society always seems to be labeled "republican", "democratic", "anarchic", "oligarchic", etc. etc., and as I have remarked in several previous notes, Blanco is a prime offender in this regard. Even though

616 the Rifians borrowed a European word, republik, to describe the political organization of their country before 'Abd al'Krim's time, and even though they say that they employed this word because there was no central government, no makhzin, only imgharen or councilmembers acting in a state of "organized acephaly", we must not assume, for instance, that republik to a Rifian means what republic means to an American or republique to a Frenchman. Furthermore, though the American and French definitions of the term are no doubt closer to each other than either or both of them are to the Rifian, we cannot even assume that they are the same. And one of Blanco's most persistent defects in his analysis of social structure is a constant tendency to try to put square pegs into round holes.

616 12--Blanco's comparison of a jajgu to a branch of a tree (which, in fact, it actually means) and of dharfiqth to the trunk, e.g. a branch of a lineage with the lineage itself, is a comparison that Rifians themselves very frequently make. An anthropologist beginning work in the area, is always told by his informants, if he is perplexed by the intricacies of segmentary systems, to compare a tribe with a tree: trunk, major branches, minor branches growing out of these, still smaller branches, and, finally, leaves. The notion of "family trees" is just as firmly rooted in tribal Islam as in the Western World, perhaps more so.

000 13--What Blanco refers to in this very European expression is, among other things, attendance at the noon prayer on Fridays in the mosque.

[114] 14--Where Montagne committed a grave error was in his assumption that Rifian alliances work exactly the same way as the checkerboard system which he found in the Western Atlas, and of which, oddly enough, the almost hypothetical Sanhaja-Ghumara liffs in Northern Morocco also seem to have been a good example. Blanco did not fall into quite the same error, but like Montagne, he takes the Sanhaja-Ghumara liffs at their face value, and accepts them entirely.

15--In the original, bando, which is not a bad description. The liffs of a given tribe are, in fact, hostile moieties, and regarding this conceptualization of them, and the notion of balance, equilibrium and oscillation between them, see Hart, op. cit., 1958, pp. 204-6, note 44.

[614] 16--The notion that there can be more than two liffs within a clan or within a tribe may not, in fact, be beyond the realm of possibility; but the point is academic, for the end result is, no matter how one arrives at it, always two liffs. For example, clans A and B are at war, while C, D and E remain neutral. C and D, however, are hostile to each other, so that if A should ask C's aid, D will automatically join B. After this, ideally, E will split in half, one half joining A's liff and the other, B's, in order to keep the balance and symmetry complete.

17--Almost always, in the shifting liffs within clans, each liff took the name of its most powerful man; and sometimes this happened on the tribal level as well, though it was less frequent.

616 18--The concept of linkage is basic to an understanding of the functioning of Rifian liffs, as Blanco indicates. He does not, however, go

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sufficiently deeply into the problem to explain why this is so; although he does distinguish two kinds of liffs, he does not, in my estimation, make sufficiently clear why such a distinction exists. Let us look at the matter in a slightly different way.

[539] There are, indeed, two kinds of liffs, which Rifians themselves readily distinguish, and a Rifian proverb to this effect is as follows: "Kahalli nimsingha jiranagh ghar barra untimsa'dhi" ("Even if we fight among each other, we must be united against outsiders"). Thus, within
616 clans or subclans, there are "internal quarrels" (aminghi n dhikhr,
614 pl. iminghan n dhikhr), in which alliances often or sometimes even con-
619 tinuously shifted and changed over time; and within tribes, there were "external quarrels" (iminghan n barra), involving one clan or subclan against the next--and here alignments were almost invariably stable and predictable. Whenever the latter had to be activated, they were the same as they had been previously; and the feuding parties in an intra-clan war patched up their differences in order to turn their attention to attacking another clan. For this reason, permanence and impermanence of liffs tends to depend upon what levels of segmentation are under consideration, the latter applying more to lower levels and the former more to higher ones.

616 Besides the question of duration, there is another mechanism at work in the structure of liff alliances, and this has been defined by E. Gellner as "transitiveness" (see Hart, op. cit., 1958, p. 204, note 44). What is meant here is that if A and B are in liff, and B and C are, then A and C are also. This is indeed true for the Rif, but within well-circumscribed limits (the neighboring clans of immediately neighboring tribes) to be discussed below--for transitiveness does not continue ad infinitum.

616 The crux of the matter, among Rifians, is neatly revealed in their
614 terminology given above, in that "external" or "outside" or "big"
619 liffs operate on an intra-tribal level, while "internal" or "inside" or "smaller" liffs work within clans or subclans. The hall-mark of the Rifian liff system as that every single tribe in the area (and we know of no exceptions whatsoever) was permanently split down the middle, and its various clans and/or subclans, as a result, were aligned either in Faction A or Faction B; and thus the balance of power tended often but not always to be roughly symmetrical. Not only this, but it was generally expected that immediately bordering clans of neighboring tribes
[124] would help one faction and hinder the other. Two informants, from the Igzinnayen, in fact, visualized the whole Rif, from their own tribe (in altitude, the highest in the Rifian-speaking universe) down to the Mediterranean, as a veritable network of such alliances! Small wonder, therefore, that Montagne, de la Chapelle, Justinard, Blanco and others who have published on the subject have found it so fascinating. Because of the internal split into two more or less equal parts in each individual tribe, and because of participation (if not in manpower, at least with money or rifles), of adjoining segments of neighboring tribes, the Rifian alliance system seems more complicated to me than the out-and-out chess- or checker-board-type liffs of the Western Atlas (if Montagne et al. are correct, as J. Berque, op. cit., 1955, pp. 424-39, has cast doubts on the Montagnian hypothesis); and we would liken it more to the links of a chrin--as Blanco does, though perhaps he does so unwittingly through not having had all the facts at his disposal.

671 613 628 728 554 by such a simple and voluntary act it was converted at the same time to an arbiter of incidents and an executor of decisions. The function is not gratuitous as in modern states, for if in the latter the contributor pays indirectly, he does so directly in the Rif. Their covetousness thus awakened, they evidently insured temporarily against feud renewal, but they also stipulated that it would revive the embers of their hatred.

671 613 628 182 [183] These agreements or inter-lineage truces obeyed a double mechanism originating from the vicious circle in which they were debated. On the one hand they originated a series of regulatory norms of coexistence which, gaining in amplitude of concept and extending their jurisdiction to the generalizing of their advantages and the persistence of their exemplarity, painfully came to gain the adhesion of other nearby and related lineages until they were adopted by larger social and territorial units, including districts or entire tribes; and this situation gave rise to some of those qanuns upon which we will comment further on. On the other hand, they represented the ultimate [728] [195] step to which anarchy led, responding to those most curious periods of their history in which one powerful group, having recourse to violence, broke the truce in defense of its own interests, the official recognition of this fact being given by the imgharen in the suq in the face of general consternation, with the tragic phrase War dha bu r-haqq.[12]

628 602 182 195 "Now there is no law"[13]: such was the official form of declaring the state of anarchy into which the Rifians so frequently fell, a phrase which obliged them to strengthen their kin group, without dismay and by all means in their power; for a man's kinsmen were his last refuge in case of social accident.

000 the proportion, in context, of the fines.

671 There are no offenses against the form of government, nor
687 against religion; more aptly put, there is no need to invent such
688 offenses, nor, by the same token, any punishment for them, because
184 all are agreed in such questions: republic and Islam.

184 This unanimity of opinion among the different groups of legis-
614 lators in the diverse clans of the tribe proves to us their (relative)
619 independence, and this is one of the ties which gives the tribe its
671 form.[81] It is clear that if individuals and families respond to a
602 private common law, the associations of these kin groups, the (uni-
linear) principles which link them together, and their common law
could not be very different, given their proximity (i.e. to each other).

671 These qanuns, which are the most outstanding signs of the
614 rudimentary (sic) common or public law of the Rifians, reveal to us
and define better than any other consideration (i.e. aspect of Rifian
life, or institution) the reality and importance of that social unit,
the clan, both a truly independent state and the ancient fatherland
(patria) of the Rifian; and the whole of this, the ensemble[82], explains
the Rifians' capacity for resistance in the struggle against any in-
vader through the multiple compartmented monopolies (i.e. clans), each
of which was opposed to the other, at the same time as it showed im-
potence and weakness to the outside (world).

671 These lay and democratic laws, full of suggestions, show the
619 Rif to be a land of custom, forming, as Montagne shows so clearly for
181 other Berber groups[83], a mosaic of minute independent republics, in
opposition to the Moroccan Empire, with its rigid sharifian organiza-
tion and administrative framework of qa'ids; for the qa'id is, as we

121 and desert areas remained politically distinct from the Sultan's
105 regime. These areas, of which the Rif was one, were called the
bled-as-siba, or the land of insolence. In such areas there was
571 no centralized political authority and whatever small degree of
security that existed came from a system of social relationships
whereby mutual assistance was expected and granted. The absence
of political integration at any higher than the local kin and
residence group was paralleled by an absence of extensive economic
121 integration. Not only political success but economic well-being
105 as well depended on relatives, friends and neighbors all support-
571 ing one another. Out of this developed an economic system based
602 on status. By "status" I mean an economy in which the deployment
433 of resources is based primarily, though not exclusively, on imper-
556 atives derived from social relationships and religious obligations.
In such societies wealth is expended on ceremonial activities, on
reciprocal obligations, on the gift and countergift. In an indus-
trial society there are analogous ceremonies and celebrations in
which wealth is spent on relatives and ritual. However, such
expenses are marginal to the amount of total outlay. Such expen-
ditures have proportionately little effect on the sum total of
wealth in comparison to expenditures connected with rational pro-
duction. By way of contrast, in a nonindustrial society social
expenditures of wealth can be the most important way in which
121 wealth is utilized. In a society heavily dependent on local ties,
105 on kin alliance, on neighborhood association, social activities
571 tend to be the essence and breadth of the group. Production is
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121 aimed primarily at satisfying needs and obligations which arise
105 from these activities. Distribution supports the continuation
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602 of these activities and the social relationships that they help
433 establish.

The central problem I have set for myself is to describe
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128 and explore all actual uses of wealth and types of exchanges in the Rif. To the economist orientated towards the analysis of the set of economic variables in an industrial society the method used here may seem distant from his customary procedure. There are few charts and no graphs. Whatever quantification that has been achieved is the result of rough scaling. Yet such estimates can give us an idea of the proportionate percentage of goods used for subsistence, for ceremonial purposes, for cash from the market, and so forth. By analyzing the relative importance of each type of expense one can grasp the dynamics by which the system is driven.

As I shall point out in the body of my thesis, the condi-
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433 tions in which this economic system developed lie in the fact that
571 the Rif was part of the bled-as-siba and, as such, it was soci-
602 ally, politically, and economically detached from the rest of Morocco. Under such circumstances, the Rif society developed its own system of exchanges as a relatively successful adaptation to the absence of political integration. While political condi-
[178] tions have radically altered over the past few decades, the social relationships, traditional obligations and expectations have remained as major organizing principles of the Berber society.

591 Neolocality is
178 the preferred residence pattern today and matrilocality is permitted.

613 The rights and duties of these descent groups are rather
596 more fluid than is generally reported for African societies. As
602 I shall discuss in Chapter 5, the principle of patrimony does not
571 rule out other types of kinship alignment nor are kin ties the only form of relationship. Each community is made up of both kinsmen and non-kin with relations based on economic association, friendship or communal obligations.

178 In the Rif today the jural authority of the upper levels of segmentation[1] has been superseded by buresucratic organization. [613] However, in the lower rungs such as the dharfiqth and ijuiga [596] traditional social obligations are still extant. [602]

The final social unit in the Rif is the local community 621 or dchar, a neighborhood association both both kinsmen and non-kin (called douar in other Berber areas). The size of such a community varies considerably. If we take the tribe of Ibuqquyen 621 we find that it is divided into three fractions. In a survey I 619 took in 1966, the fraction of Tagidit had 14 dchars, the largest 162 having a population of 707 persons living in 114 different homesteads, while the smallest consisted of 94 persons living in 47 households. In the fraction of Axgar, the largest was 607 people living in 107 homes and the smallest was 163 people in 34 homes. In Izmourin, the most populous of the three fractions, the largest dchar had 1,509 people living in 268 homes and the smallest had 228 living in 35 homes.

1. [i.e., the ar-rba or tribal levels--Analyst]

the Berber. Of the various steps that one passes through, domestic celebrations of any magnitude occur only with the naming of the child and marriage. Birth itself, first haircut, circumcision and death are attended by very unelaborate ceremonies.

The ceremonial activities surrounding birth are rather insignificant. When the woman is on the point of delivery she sends for the neighborhood women and for a midwife. Relatives may come and often do although they are not required to. Coon (1931:123) states that on this day a sheep or goat is sacrificed. While wealthier families may offer an animal to feed the assembled guests, it is not ritually incumbent upon them to do so. However, the occasion of the birth of a male child, especially a first-born boy, is one of great joy and such hospitality is not uncommon among those who can afford it.

Coon may have been confusing the birth with the naming ceremony, which occurs seven days later and which is socially the second most important initiation ceremony in the society. On this day the father invites all the brothers and sisters of his wife as well as his own siblings. This is a time during which familial solidarity is required and all close kin of the child on both his mother's and father's sides are expected to be present and to offer gifts. The amount of gift is not fixed but is determined by the economic level of the giver and by previous obligations established by gifts that the giver has received from the parents. These presents include a small amount of money, 20 to 50 kilos of barley flour, a dozen loaves of bread, several

553 574 602 431 [578] cones of sugar, and a few kilos of tea. For a man, especially father's brother and mother's brother, not to attend this ceremony and offer gifts is regarded as a public repudiation of the family. On the other hand, the gift maintains the giver's right to aid and mutual support by placing these obligations on the recipient.

553 782 At approximately ten o'clock on the morning of this day the mother brings the child out onto the patio and the father sacrifices a ram. As he kills the beast he whispers into its ear three times, "Your name is...," calling it the same name as that of the newborn child. Only by propitiating the gods in such a manner can the child be properly baptized.

553 574 621 On the evening of this day, an open invitation is extended to everyone in the dchar. However, since anyone who comes is expected to bring gifts of barley, bread, and money, the actual number of guests will include only a restricted group. Everyone who attended the wedding ceremony of the parents is expected to be present. The celebration for a child of a rich man is the

553 556 574 best attended, since he is expected to provide large amounts of food and often hires professional musicians and dancing boys. Such festivities are the chief and most appreciated form of public entertainment to the Riffian. A more important factor, how-

[571] ever, is that the wealthier a man is, the more social contacts and obligations he has formed. Of course, rivals for superiority often do not attend the ceremony, using such occasions to emphasize their independence and competitiveness. The naming ceremony

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584 are not available, the father's brother. The negotiations may have begun at the request of a young man who has already selected a girl, but more likely they have been initiated by the parents without the knowledge of the children involved. The more isolated [178] and traditional the dchar, the more prevalent is the exclusion of [621] the children themselves. This, as well as the subsequent description and analysis, applies only to initial marriages. Men with [595] multiple wives generally arrange all subsequent matrimonies. The [369] urban context in the city of Alhucemas is different in that the majority of young men are cash earners capable of arranging their own marriage. Needless to say, no matter what the context, the [593] man attempts to have parental approval. An open break with one's family carries with it a high burden of social shame and inconvenience.

584 581 The opening of negotiations is very delicate. Men attempt to marry their offspring in the most advantageous manner, either to families who are superior to their own or to equals. The strategy of choice is better understood when we recall the historical context of the Rif. As noted in Chapter 1, Rif society [571] was acephalous with a tendency toward anarchy. In such a situ- [602] ation each family sought security through a system of alliances based in part on kin ties. Although today internal security is [178] guaranteed by the national government, there is still a heavy [571] overlay of the ideology of alliance in influencing marriage, based on social and economic conditions. The shorfa or des- 565 582 792 cendents of the Prophet are still supposed to marry only into

582 Within any one dharfiqth
[613] there are both endogamous and exogamous marriage. The same holds
582 true for the fraction although endogamy at this structural level
619 is probably more pronounced. There is no prohibition against marriage into other tribes and such marriage seems more a function of proximity than any cultural rule. There is more tribal exogamy between Ait Kamara in the Beni Wariyaghar and Izmourin in Ibuqquyen or Arba Turirt in Beni Wariyaghar and Igzimnayen than
565 for the respective tribes as a whole. Proximity tends to be less
582 important among the notables who have a smaller pool of prospects from which to draw.

582 The main structural consequence of the absence of pro-
602 scriptive rules is that there is no common genealogical unity
611 at any level of social organization beyond the extended family. Since recruitment into the descent group does not follow any single principle, there is a weakening of the patrilineal prin-
611 ciple. Although rights in property and children almost always
602 remain in the patrilineal line, the organization of the society is not exclusively or even preponderantly based on this principle. A man's matrilineal relatives (who may with cousin marriage also be related through patrilineal lines), as well as non-related friends, neighbors, and patrons, may receive equal or greater emphasis. A further weakening of the patrilineal principle was

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582 of such marriages does not appear to be high. It might be more
114 correct to state that FaBrDa marriage is neither a preferred nor
[829] a completely approved union. As one young man expressed to me with disgust: "It's a custom of the Arabs. But it is wrong. It's like marrying your sister." The comment was made as we prepared to attend exactly such a union.

178 A further weakening of the patrilineal principle was
41 that before pacification, one of the most common kinds of quar-
602 rels was between brothers over irrigation rights. In such situ-
578 ations it was not unnatural to emphasize alliances through matri-
lineal lines.

121 I think that the principle of unilineality is not as
611 important in the Rif as it is ascribed to be in many nonindus-
[511] trial and nonliterate societies. Social alliances are calculated
to bring the maximum social value to both parties. While this
makes for difficulty at the analytic level in interpreting the
structural unity of the society and the interrelationship of its
parts, it does not much bother the Riffians who need only conform
to a workable system and not an anthropological model.

582 While marriage rules are not as rigid as in many non-
584 industrial societies, they are likewise not random. One must
decide whether to marry a relative and by doing so reinforce
bonds of prior common interest or marry a nonrelated person and
set up new bonds. There are compelling reasons for making either
type of alliance and the final decision is made on the basis of
an evaluation of these factors as well as personal preference on
the part of the boy and girl.

584 While most marriages are arranged by the parents, the
couple, especially the boy, do have some role in the matter
should they refuse to be passive. Daughters are rarely con-
sulted as to preference, although fathers are not as autocratic
as often depicted in Berber ethnographies. A girl's most likely
chance of avoiding a marriage in which she has no choice is to

585 The primary social obligation for the guests occurs on the night of the wedding ceremony. On this evening the bride [593] is brought by her elder brother or a close male relative (but [602] not her father or uncles) to the home of the groom. Transpor- [492] tation is usually by mule with the bride leading the procession, [754] atop a mule and wrapped from head to toe in cloth to avoid the [494] evil eye. In the more accessible areas and among the wealthier [492] families, the bride is brought by truck or taxi to within a few [178] hundred yards of the groom's home where she mounts a mule and follows the rest of the customary procedure. Her parents are left behind at their home and do not see her for another seven days. The bride, dangling precariously from her mount and followed by her entourage, is met some fifty yards in front of the groom's house by his party. This moment signals a renewal of festivities by songs and dances by both a group of girls who accompany the bride and a group of girls associated with the groom's family. Entered into this melee are also the profes- [533] sional musicians, making the entrance into the groom's home quite spectacular. The bride when she arrives at the house is handed a bag of barley which she ceremonially tosses to the right, left, and directly behind her, symbolically representing the hope of fertility from her concourse with her new husband. She then enters the house and remains isolated with the women until the next day.

585 The social obligations of the guests occur at this time, 574 when they are expected to give gifts of cash to whoever sponsored 591 431

000 general public disapproval, if he begs off the pilgrimage. The
788 authority that al-Hadj possesses is quite real and the man who
484 feels his resources might be better deployed for profit-making
554 enterprises will not carry this authority within the community. If a man wishes to maintain a position of prominence in the Rif and is fifty years or older, it is practically mandatory for him to travel to Mecca.

796 While the hadj does not affect all the Rif economically the ceremony of the Great Feast or Aid al-Kebir which is held all over the Muslim world on the tenth day of Dhu 'l-Hijja has
[782] a universal application. On this date every family head must sacrifice a ram to commemorate God's beneficence in allowing Abraham to sacrifice a lamb in the stead of his son Ishmael.

796 The month preceding this ceremony is one of intense
591 anxiety for the poor, for they must acquire either the animal
602 or the money by which to get one. Many of the Riffians have a
435 stock of animals from which they can select the sacrificial ram.
[152] Those who do not must rely on their wealthier sponsors, either
[231] relatives or business associates. The price of rams spirals upwards as the day of Aid al-Kebir approaches, reaching its climax the day before the celebration. Men who normally earn a subsistence wage in Alhucemas or Targuist begin to spend more time among their relatives in the countryside as they attempt to reinforce their communal support within the traditional cul-
796 tural setting. In many ways the celebration is comparable to
435 Christmas in Christian countries, except that the expenses

256 the mill collects a tenth of all the flour he processes, regard-
435 less of the level of demand or any market condition. While mills
472 are not economically competitive with one another, they are soci-
256
472 ally competitive. As one informant put it: "My father was better
477 than his, my grandfather better than his grandfather. If he has a mill, why shoulda't we?" If there is only one mill in a locality, which is a fairly rare circumstance, the entire community uses it. However, if there are two or more mills, the basis of
[571] preference on the part of the users is not determined by conveni-
[578] ence of location of the mill but in terms of social factors such
[602] as either ancient antagonisms stemming from the blood feuds of the past or familial alliance based on marriage or kinship.

Just as social motives and strictures lie behind the uses
423 of capital, so too do they influence the regulation of labor.
427 We see this in a series of sharecropping associations which arise between a man who has more property than he alone can personally cultivate (or who is prohibited from manual labor by his social and/or religious status, such as some shorfa) and a person who holds less land than he can cultivate to meet the subsistence needs of his family. The latter may or may not be a property holder, although usually he does have a small plot of his own. Land fragmentation through the peculiarities of Islamic inheritance has, however, reduced many plots to sizes too small to meet such subsistence needs as a family requires. In these cir-
[464] cumstances the Riffian hires out to those who have managed to keep larger estates or have acquired land through purchase.

427 464 562 the wife about household tasks and often takes his meals inside the central patio, he is on rather intimate (for the Rif) terms with these women. In such a close and anomalous situation, there [602] is a preference on the part of the master to hire a poor relative, especially of his wife, as a servant. By hiring a man of the wife's family or of a family which includes the wife's relatives by marriage, one lessens the danger of too close a relationship between wife and akhammas.

427 464 466 465 565 While both partners in the akhammas arrangement seek to establish a contract which is divorced from social conflict over women, they are nonetheless in basic conflict along incipient class lines. The akhammas, at least in the contemporary situation, regards himself as being exploited by his patron in that the wage scale is fixed and involves difficult manual labor without any guarantees of remmeration. While he is free to negotiate his contract with whomever he so desires, his wage depends directly on the size of the crop yield for any one year. The master with greater reserves of resources suffers only an inconvenience if the crop yield is low. The sharecropper, on the other hand, has few if any reserves, and any reduction in the portion of his share has serious repercussions on his ability to maintain his household. The akhammas is especially aware of the inequity of this arrangement as wage opportunities open up and he becomes aware that salary can be negotiated with commensurate rewards in cash. Most ikhammasen prefer to get into the category of wage